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Book Reviews

THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY by John
Agresto. * Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1984)
192 pp. $7.95.
Reviewed by Neal E. Devins**

The judicial branch is the clear focus of constitutional decisionmaking; national debate regarding abortion, busing, school prayer,
and the rights of the criminally accused generally fastens on the
Supreme Court's decisions. Concerned that "[t]oday citizens,
members of Congress and presidents alike look to the courts for
all constitutional deliberation - that is, for all decisions involving
the deepest questions of national direction,"1 John Agresto emphasizes the need for the executive and Congress to check the judiciary and to develop constitutional law by interpreting the
Constitution independently. Agresta's work, The Supreme Court
and Constitutional Democracy, offers a new perspective on the
ongoing debate over constitutional interpretation and the role of
the Supreme Court in American government.
Part I of this Review describes Agresta's theory of "constitutional" government and its impact on our conception of judicial
review. Part II assesses the viability of that theory.
* Deputy Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities.
** Assistant General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. The views expressed are those of the author. The author would like to
thank Louis Fisher and Ron Gross for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft
of this review.
1. J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11
(1984).
May 1986 Vol. 54 No. 4

L Agresto 's Theory of Constitutional Government
Congress and the executive are undoubtedly authorized to interpret the Constitution.2 Congress's repeated passage (and the
executive's repeated signing) of child-labor laws, in the face of
contrary rulings by the Court, is but one example of independent
constitutional interpretation by the elected branches.3 Nevertheless, scholars addressing the role of the Supreme Court in American government rarely view constitutional interpretation as the
interplay between the Court and the other branches of
government.4
Unlike the spate of recent works on judicial review,5 The
Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy is concerned with
the relationship of Congress and of the executive to the Supreme
Court. For Agresto,
[C]onstitutional government implies that the ultimate interpreter of our fundamental law is not an autonomous judiciary
but the interactive understanding of the people, their
representatives, and their judges together. We should see the
American political system not as a pyramid, with the Court at
the top as the ultimate authority, but rather as an interlocking
2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REv. 707, 747 (1985).
3. See J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 27-31. After invalidating child-labor legislation in 1918, see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), and again in 1922,
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922), the Supreme Court upheld Congress's third child-labor statute as a legitimate exercise of its Commerce Clause
power, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). See J. AGRESTO, supra note 1,
at 29-31.
4. Scholars merely have compared institutions' capacities for making and implementing social policy. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 298
(1977) (concluding that the judicial process is ill-suited to consider competing interests
and institute social reform); M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE COURTS at xi (1982) (proposing that courts, in view of separation of powers
and their fact-finding capabilities, are adept at making policy decisions on education
issues); Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984) (suggesting that when confronted with constitutional issues the Court should compare the various
governmental institutions' abilities to deal with a particular issue and, on the basis of
that comparison, choose the best decisionmaker from among them).
5. In recent years, major works by prominent scholars and jurists have offered
conflicting views of the appropriateness, scope, and effect of judicial review.
Although great differences exist within this body of scholarship, these varying inquiries serve the limited purpose of justifying or of undermining judicial review without
addressing the ongoing dialogue between the branches. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 407-48 (1977) (suggesting that the Court's expansive decisions on
suffrage and segregation are contrary to the framers' intent and constitute judicial
legislation); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 241-49 (1982) (contending that judicial
review is not legitimated by social or political theory but by the legal system's theoretical imperatives); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 258-59 (1980) (advocating limiting Supreme Court review to individual rights
cases); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-83 (1980) (recommending limiting judicial review to the policymaking process as opposed to policy content); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 163-65 (1982) (supporting noninterpretive review as a protection of individual rights); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that insufficiently limited judicial review has been disastrous historically and does not comport with concepts of
separation of powers ani! r~ ..,.,n,.,.,.t;,. anu..,.,Tn ..nt)
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system of mutual oversight, mutual checking, and combined
interpretation.6

Agresta's structural approach does not deny judicial review. Instead, it sees judicial review as but one component of "interactive"
constitutional interpretation.
By considering judicial review in terms of our tripartite governmental scheme, Agresto's work is characterized by its dual advocacy of judicial review and checks on judicial power. On one hand,
he sees judicial review as a necessary component of constitutional
government, for it serves as a "restraint[ ] on the democratic
will." 7 On the other hand, he argues that "insofar as the Court has
been a leader in the making and enforcement of societal rules, the
concerns of those who decry the dangers of judicial imperialism
can no longer be lightly dismissed."8 This dual advocacy, rather
than placing him in an intractable position of self-contradiction,
creates a dynamic that is vital to Agresto's theory of structural
constitutional interpretation. By recognizing both the promise
and the peril of judicial review, Agresto is not forced to choose
between a limited and an active judiciary. Instead, he seeks a middle ground - a way to encourage both judicial activism and the
coordinate review of judicial decisionmaking.
There is surface appeal to Agresto's approach. Judicial review is
neither foreclosed nor made supreme - two extremes that few
people find satisfactory. But in advancing his theory of structural
constitutional interpretation, Agresto fails to flesh out its necessary components. Specifically, by not prescribing appropriate
standards of conduct for the three branches,9 Agresto makes the
successful implementation of his proposal unlikely.
Agresto confronts the issue of judicial review on distinctly pragmatic grounds. Rather than striving to create an ideal (or better)
society, Agresto's concerns are whether judicial review plays a
necessary role in our governmental scheme and, if it does, how the
elected branches should interact with an "activist" Court.
Agresto concludes that judicial review is necessary because it
serves two essential purposes. First, Agresto argues that judicial
review ensures that government does not place the temporal popular will above the eternal Constitution.10 In other words, judicial
6. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 10.
7. Id. at 53.
8. Id. at 163.
9. For example, Agresto clearly indicates his displeasure with Court rulings on
abortion, school prayer, and busing, id. at 11, 156-63, and his approval of President
Abraham Lincoln's interpretation of the Dred Scott decision, id. at 90-94.
10. See id. at 52-55. For Agresto, judicial review "[b]uild[s] on the Founder's desire to overcome the dane:ers of maioritarian despotism or lee:islative tyranny (yet
retain 'the spirit and
'

review ensures that the popular will, as expressed in legislative
and executive action, conforms to the Constitution. The elected
branches, according to Agresto, cannot accomplish this purpose.
Functioning within the limitations of democratic elections,
Agresto feels that the actions of the president and Congress, at
best, will reflect the popular will. 11
Second, Agresto contends that judicial review "contributes to
the demands of a free society,"12 for it prevents the Constitution
from becoming a stagnant, time-bound document. Towards this
end, he speaks loftily of "[t]he Court's ... promise ... to help us
apply and develop our fundamental principles and constitutional
commands, its ability ... to help bring our philosophy to bear on
our actions, to work out our present and our future in terms of our
inheritance from the past."13 Agresto thus supports judicial review, in part, because of the Court's "capacit[y] for dealing with
matters of principle."l4
Agresto, although a proponent of judicial review, differs substantially from contemporary scholars who contend that the judiciary is the branch most capable of advancing American values15
and the interests of the underrepresented. 16 Unlike these thinkers, Agresto argues that "the desire to live by stated principle
means that no branch, not even the Court, can reform or shape
those values freely or at will."17 Claiming that our system of
checks and balances is a response to fears over the possible centralization of power in any branch of government, Agresto argues
that "[p]ower checked mean[s] liberty supported."18 He thus
11. See id. at 52-53.
12. Id. at 152.
13. Id. at 156-57.
14. ld. at 149 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 25 (1962)).
Agresto further argues that "[a]t its peak the Court will be that part of American
politics which more than any other struggles to work out the implications of our beliefs. More than any other branch the Court explains to us the living mute words of
the Constitution ...." Id. at 146.
15. SeeP. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 94.
16. See J. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 68; M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 152-54.
17. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 55. In this way, Agresto's thinking resembles
Thomas Jefferson's views regarding judicial review. According to Jefferson, "Our
country has thought proper to distribute the powers of its Government among three
equal and independent authorities, constituting each a check on one or both of the
others, in all attempts to impair its Constitution." C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 266 (1926) (quoting C. BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 454-55 (1915) (quoting message by President Thomas Jefferson to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801) [hereinafter Jefferson's message to Congress] (passage omitted from message before delivery))). This passage is remarkably similar to
Agresto's argument in emphasizing both the independence of each branch and the
interlocking nature of our system of checks and balances. Unlike Agresto, however,
Jefferson also contended that each branch "within the line of its proper functions ...
acts in the last resort and without appeal." Id. at 266 (quoting C. BEARD, supra at 45455 (quoting Jefferson's message to Congress)). In other words, as Agresto recognizes,
Jefferson did not support an interactive constitutional dialogue between the branches;
"[r]ather, he held that each branch must construe the Constitution for itself as it
concerns its own functions." J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 80 (emphasis in original).
18. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 142. Agresto's concern extends beyond simple
reciprocal checks, for he contends that each branch has a responsibility to develop
constitutional law throu"h innPnPnnPnt t>nnc:titntinn" 1 int.,,.,...,-.,t,tin~. See supra text
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blends his recognition of the Court's special role "as the mediator
of our principles"19 with his belief that constitutional government
is furthered by the elected branches serving as a check on the
courts and vice versa.20
Agresta, to make concrete these fears of possible judicial centralization, claims that there presently is a need for the elected
branches to stymie activist Court rulemaking. Pointing to
Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, abortion, and busing,
he posits that, unless checked, the judiciary is "exceedingly dangerous ... in its ability to be the creator, the designer, of new
social policy."21 Moreover, to demonstrate that judicial centralization should be of concern to both liberals and conservatives, he
notes that, prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 22 judicial action
frequently limited human and civil rights.2s
With respect to an understanding of when and to what extent
the elected branches should check Court decisions, Agresta provides little guidance.24 In fact, all that Agresta makes clear is that
he supports Abraham Lincoln's approach toward the finality of
judicial decisionmaking.25 Lincoln, in response to the Supreme
Court's recognition in the Dred Scott case of the right of whites to
own black slaves,26 argued that Court decisions bind only the parties to the suit.27 Under this vision, the impact of the Court's decisions are limited, and the elected branches remain free to shape
future political action. Indeed, as Agresta posits, the elected
accompanying note 6; infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. Critics of Agresta fail
to understand this distinction. Professor Ronald Kahn, for example, claims that
Agresta's "[simplistic belief] that an expanded congressional checking power [i.e., reciprocal checks] will reinvigorate the doctrine of separation of powers" makes his theory unworkable. Kahn, Process and Rights Principles in Modem Constitutional
Theory (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. REv. 253, 256 (1984) (reviewing J. AGRESTO, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)).
19. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 55.
20. Id. at 119.
21. Id. at 11.
22. 349 u.s. 294 (1955).
23. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 154.
24. Because of his support of active judicial review, Agresta makes clear his dissatisfaction with court-curbing measures bandied about in recent years. Impeachment is considered too severe and politically impossible; limitations on federal courts'
subject-matter jurisdiction are also viewed as too severe, because such legislation
would deny judicial review. Id. at 119-20. Agresta also rejects judicial self-restraint
because, if rigorously applied, it would "seriously mininllze[ ]" the judiciary's ability
"to contribute to the healthy governance of the nation." Id. at 113. Finally, although
recognizing that such procedural devices as the establishment of narrower requirements for class action suits ''have substantial merit," Agresta is "not yet certain that
we should want a Court ... prevented from 'pondering abstract principles.' " Id. at
133-34 (quoting McDowell, A Modest Remedy for Judicial Activism, 61 PuB. INTEREST
3, 6 (1982)).
25. Id. at 87-95.
26. Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393. 411-12 (1856).
27. See J. AGRESTO, s:

branches have an obligation to check such improper judicial action
by acting on their independent constitutional interpretations.28
Agresta, however, never specifies the manner in which the
elected branches can determine the propriety of a Court decision
or how the elected branches should respond to an improper decision. Apparently, Agresta's sole concern is that the elected
branches do act, not how they act.

IL

Analysis

Agresta clearly hopes that the elected branches become actively
involved in constitutional interpretation. He views constitutional
government "as an interlocking system of mutual oversight, mutual checking, and combined interpretation."29 Pointing to the
"manifest errors of judicial legislation," he argues that "[w]e must,
of course, go further than to signal our concern over particular
acts of modern judicial policy,"30 and he views as exemplary
Lincoln's response to Dred Scott.31 Moreover, while Agresta
acknowledges that "this book cannot hope to prod Congress to
act," 32 he hopes that his book will result in a greater "recognition
that the Court's interpretations of the Constitution need not be
immediately accepted as binding 'rules of political action.' " 3 3
To merely encourage legislative and executive responses to judicial action, as Agresta does, serves only the narrow purpose of limiting the authority of the courts. Agresta claims that this is not his
aim; he considers judicial review an essential component of constitutional government.34 Yet, without suggesting standards to govern the appropriate responses of the elected branches to judicial
action, Congress and the executive might act, or fail to act, in a
counterproductive manner. At one extreme, the elected branches
may respond too weakly to inappropriate judicial action. For example, had Congress accepted the Court's invalidation of child labor laws in 1918, many more lives would have been ruined in the
factories. At the other extreme, the elected branches may respond too strongly to appropriate judicial action. For example,
had Congress sought to undercut Brown v. Board of Education by
28. Id. at 94 (stating that "the Lincolnian position does begin with the notion that
all parts of the political process - the democratic branches as well as the courts have a legitimate hand in shaping the meaning of the constitutional text").
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. at 162.
31. See supra note 9.
32. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 137.
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 10-14 & 24 and accompanying text. Professor Lino Graglia
misconstrues Agresto's criticism of activist Court rulings on abortion, school prayer,
and school desegregation. In Graglia's view, to oppose such activist rulings is to oppose activist judicial review. Graglia thus concludes that Agresto "defeats his purpose
[of limiting judicial review] entirely by embracing" an aspirational approach towards
constitutional interpretation. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational
Defense of Judicial Review CBook Review), 98 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (1985) (reviewing J. AGRESTO, THE
· (1984)).
H
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limiting federal court power in desegregation cases,35 many black
and white children would have been denied the opportunity to
learn with each other.
The risk of such improper elected branch action is substantial.
Executive and congressional action plainly suggests that those
branches cannot be trusted to distinguish proper from improper
judicial action and to act in turn. With reference to Congress,
Abner Mikva, former congressman and now D.C. circuit judge, recently commented that "[f]or the most part, legislative debate does
not explore the constitutional implications of pending legislation;
and, at best, Congress does an uneven job of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it adopts." 36 Although there is reason
to believe, as Dr. Louis Fisher aptly remarks, that "[m]embers of
Congress have both the authority and the capability to participate
constructively in constitutional interpretation,"37 Congress, at
best, acts cautiously on constitutional matters -thus making it an
unlikely participant in an active constitutional dialogue with the
other branches.
Executive constitutional interpretation is subject to similar criticism. The Reagan administration, for example, has advocated
that the judiciary pay greater attention to values of justiciability in
constitutional decisionmaking.38 Policy preference and political
expediency, however, have made the administration's support of
these values merely rhetorical.39 For example, in the Supreme
35. The constitutionality of such congressional action is subject to question. Compare Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 197 (1981) (approving proposed
legislation to limit federal court authority) with Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term
-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HAR.v. L. REV.17, 70 (1981) (stating that Congress
should not have authority to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over constitutional
claims).
36. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C.L. REV. 587, 587 (1983). Also recognizing Congress's limitations is Professor
Owen Fiss, who commented, "Legislatures ... are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see
their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the
people ...." Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms ofJustice,
93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1980).
37. Fisher, supra note 2, at 747. For Dr. Fisher, "[m]uch of constitutional law
depends on fact-finding and the balancing of competing values, areas in which Congress justifiably can claim substantial expertise." I d. Moreover, as Senator Harrison
Schmitt argues, "[C]ourts may lack the institutional capacity to review all aspects of
legislative decisions, such as the subjective motivations of the lawmakers. Here, if the
Constitution is to be applied at all, it must be applied by ourselves as lawmakers." 128
CONG. REC. 5091 (1982) (statement of Sen. Schmitt).
38. See, e.g., Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A. J. 59, 60 (1982) (stating
that the Reagan administration will admonish courts "to observe strictly the requirements of justiciability").
39. See Devins, Who~ toBlameforJudicialActivism?, Wall St. J., Apr.17, 1984,
at 34, col. 3.

Court's 1983-84 term, the administration proferred inconsistent
views of Article III standing requirements. In Heckler v. Mathews,
the administration conceded that a male plaintiff could challenge
a sex-based governmental classification solely because he was a
male;40 but in Allen v. Wright, it claimed that parents of black
school children could not challenge governmental compliance
with antidiscrimination laws solely because they were black.41
The inability of the tug and pull of the three branches to invariably result in "appropriate" constitutional interpretation is exemplified by the recent controversy concerning the tax-exempt
status of racially discriminatory private schools.42 In May 1983,
the Supreme Court, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 43
upheld an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling 44 that denied tax
exemptions to private schools that practice racial discrimination. 45
In order for the Court to resolve this issue, however, all three
branches of government ignored their designated roles in our constitutional scheme.
Congress, well aware of the tax-exemption controversy for
more than fifteen years, has yet to enact clear legislation on this
matter. Instead, it has permitted a jerry-built regulatory scheme
to originate primarily from court rulemaking. The closest Congress has come to acting on this matter was during the Carter administration when it prohibited the IRS from implementing its
1978 proposal46 that tax-exempt private schools satisfy quota-like,
nondiscrimination enforcement standards.47 Congress did not
respond, however, to President Reagan's January 1982 announcement4s that he would support tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. In fact, our legislators could not even muster
enough support to approve a proposed concurrent resolution opposing the administration's position.49 Congress thus has never
given any real guidance to the other branches of government in
40. Brief for Appellant at 48, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (No. 821050).
41. Brief for Federal Petitioners at 24, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (No.
81-757).
42. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 462-65 (1984).
43. 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 461
u.s. 574 (1983).
44. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
45. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605.
46. Proposed Revenue Procedures on Private Tax-exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg.
9451 (1979) (proposed Feb. 13, 1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978) (proposed Aug. 22,
1978).
47. Congress delayed implementation of the proposed IRS procedure by denying
appropriations for the procedure's formulation or enforcement. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103,
614-615, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 501
(1982)).
48. Statement on Tax Exemptions for Private, Nonprofit Educational Institutions, 1 PuB. PAPERS 17 (Jan. 12, 1982).
49. See S. Con. Res. 59, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 363 (1982). Ironically,
the basis of the Reagan policy was the administration's preference that Congress enact specific legislation '
r organiza-
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interpreting or implementing its intent on the tax-exemption
issue.
The president neglected his rulemaking responsibility on this
matter in a quite different fashion. Immediately after announcing
its decision to grant tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
schools, the Reagan administration filed a motion to dismiss the
Bob Jones University lawsuit, claiming that it was moot.50 After
the administration suffered severe criticism and political embarrassment for this policy decision, the Justice Department asked
the Supreme Court to hear the Bob Jones suit.s1 The Reagan
administration, however, was unwilling to reverse its January
1982 decision to grant tax-exempt status.52 Consequently, the Department was forced to ask the Court to appoint "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones University on the case's underlying issue so
that the case would satisfy the threshold constitutional requirement of adverseness.5 3
Adverseness, however, also requires that the parties who bring
a case to court should be the ones whose interests will be represented before the court.54 Thus the administration's request abandoned a fundamental requirement of federal judicial proceedings.
Instead of abiding by the Constitution's inherent restrictions on
federal court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case,55 thus transferring to the judiciary the apparent responsibility for a controversial political decision. Shortly after the
Supreme Court appointed "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones University, Congress refused to ratify those limitations it had earlier
placed on the Carter IRS, claiming that it was inappropriate for
the legislature to act on this matter in light of the Supreme
Court's forthcoming decision in Bob Jones University. 56
The tax-exemption debate, in which all three branches failed to
assume their constitutionally designated responsibilities, highlights possible pitfalls of interbranch dialogue. Such pitfalls do
not refute Agresto's thesis; he is concerned with how constitutional interpretation should proceed, not with how it has failed in
the past. But Agresto provides little guidance to those interested
tions instead of having an administrative agency's decision govern the issue. See
supra note 48, at 17.
50. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585 n.9.
51. See id.; Administration Asks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue,
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4 [hereinafter School Exemption Issue].
52. Bob Jones Univ., 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
53. See School Exemption Issue, supra note 51, at A3, col. 4.
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); McCoy & Devins, supra note 42,
at 442 n.4.
55. Bob Jones Univ., 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
56. See 128 CONG. REC. 8622 (statement of Rep. Shannon); id. (statement of Rep.
Panetta).

in implementing his proposal. On one hand, Agresta encourages
judicial activism because "the deliberate and often cumbersome
arrangements of legislative institutions in America ... are sometimes too slow and often unable to remedy the denial of rights and
privileges to certain individuals, groups, and classes."57 On the
other hand, Agresta asks the question: "What checks can we devise in order to superintend a judiciary with (it is claimed) final
power over policies involving abortion, welfare, schools, police,
racial balance, busing, [and] employment?"58
How then do we distinguish reasonable from unreasonable judicial conduct (or proper from improper elected branch responses to
court decisions)? Agresta provides examples of what he considers
appropriate elected branch responses to judicial action.59 Yet, by
not delineating his own values, Agresta leaves the implementation
of structural constitutional interpretation to the myriad and oftconflicting views of his readers. As such, individuals who approve
of the busing and abortion decisions and disapprove of decisions
limiting, for example, court-ordered racial quotas in employment60 can line up behind Agresta. That Agresta clearly disagrees
with these individuals, and that nothing in his book could be used
to refute their position, points to the need for Agresta to recommend criteria governing the implementation of his theory.
Notwithstanding this limitation, Agresta's book is a valuable
contribution to the current debate over the legitimacy and scope
of judicial review. Agresta makes an effective case for checking
the judiciary. By highlighting the Supreme Court's hostility
towards legislatively enacted individual rights protections prior to
Brown v. Board of Education, 61 Agresta demonstrates that great
perils surround a judiciary willing to invalidate governmental programs.62 These "costs" of judicial review are substantial, pointing
to the need for further exploration of how the elected branch
might appropriately check judicial action. When viewed as a call
for elected branch review of judicial decisionmaking, The Supreme
Court and Constitutional Democracy does quite well.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 162.
Id. at 163.
See supra note 9.
See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-82 (1984).
See J. AGRES'T'n J:wrwn. nnt<> 1 .. t 97_"ln
See id. at 31.

